Software

Files available upon request.

Oligopsony

 

Have you ever wanted to predict how an auction would turn out?  Or, how likely an auction is to clear above or below a certain price? 

 

Oligopsony is a C# .NET forms application that performs uniform-price auction simulations in a repeated Monte Carlo environment.  The software allows the user to simulate multi-unit auctions with differentiated bidders and a range of custom, user-defined parameters. 

 

In general, multi-unit auctions are used as the primary market-clearing mechanism for the sale of large quantities of goods.  This includes financial products such as Treasury bills, environmental instruments such as emissions permits, or other commodities such as spectrum rights.  The uniform-price auction is the primary auction format for the pricing of emissions allowances in carbon (i.e., climate change) markets. 

 

This software allows the user to simulate thousands upon thousands of auctions to analyze and assess how structural changes in bidders and their bids will affect auction outcomes.  It is based upon the seminal work of Robert Hahn, "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1984. 

 

The software requires a dual core computer and .NET 3.0 or later. 

Simultaneous Energy-Cap & Trade Auction Experiment Software

 

 

Scholars, consultants and private firms have begun to rapidly expand their utilization of laboratory experiments to conduct research in today's complex market and policy environments. 

 

Developed on the Z-TREE platform, this software provides for the analysis of simultaneous energy-emissions markets in a controlled laboratory environment to assess the degree to which market structure affects energy-emissions market dynamics. 

 

A little bit of background... Since deregulation occurred in the late 1990s in a number of states in the U.S. and abroad, electricity markets have functioned through the use of complex regional wholesale auctions.  In these auctions, electricity producers 'compete' to supply electricity to public utilities and other electricity distributors.  Because of the nature of scale economies, these markets are not as competitive as other markets, and monopolistic conditions can (and have) arise.  At the same time, emissions markets have been implemented that help reduce pollution from the production of electricity, and other sources of combustion, in a cost-effective manner.  In theory, emissions markets should be efficient and should provide electricity producers with the most cost-effective and economically-efficient incentives for reducing pollution from the production of energy.  However, the very same firms that can exercise monopoly control over energy markets may be able to exercise monopoly control over emissions markets.  Furthermore, doing so simultaneously in both markets may further heighten monopoly control over both markets. 

 

This software provides the server and user-interface applications necessary to test this market interaction in a controlled laboratory environment.  

Carbon Market Auction Experiment Software

 

Developed on the Z-TREE platform, this software provides for the laboratory analysis of an alternative emissions auction format, the consignment auction. 

 

The consignment auction is a variation of the Hahn-Noll revenue-neutral auction, in which the commodity being auctioned is initially allocated (either partially or in its entirety) to one (or a few) of the bidders competing for a share of the commodities.  In most multi-unit auctions, bidders seek to acquire the commodities at the lowest possible cost, and auction efficiency is based upon this fundamental construct.  However, when revenue from the sale of the commodities is returned to the bidder(s), this can alter bidding incentives in inefficient ways.  Consignment auctions are utilized in the California (AB32) carbon markets.

 

This software provides the server and user-interface applications necessary to test the efficiency and performance of the consignment auction mechanism.